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Abstract 
The doctrine of informed consent in medical law and 
ethics has a strong grounding in the principle of bodily 
autonomy and self-determination of human beings. This 
emphasis on the freedom of every individual to decide 
what is best for his/her body and health has led to several 
controversies in the area of medical law and ethics in 
India and abroad, especially in the United Kingdom. 
Being a legal and ethical doctrine, „informed consent‟ has 
been discarded, accepted, modified and emulated by 
various judgments of courts. This paper will examine the 
ingenuity of courts in bringing about social change by 
upholding patient autonomy and adopting the doctrine of 
informed consent in the UK. However, this doctrine has 
been rejected by the Indian Supreme Court, citing the 
reason that Indian citizens are unprepared and ill-
equipped to understand the complexities of medical 
treatment and procedures. This view, in the author‟s 
opinion, is a missed opportunity for the Indian Supreme 
Court to bring about social change by upholding patient 
rights and autonomy. 
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That the body of every person is inviolate has been recognized as a 
fundamental principle (Re F (Mental Patient: Sterilization), 1990). 
Directly flowing from this is the duty to respect the physical 
integrity of that person which can be legally violated only with the 
valid consent of that person. Medical treatment, diagnosis, 
examination etc. requires that the doctor touch or physically 
contact the patient. However, a legal requirement exists which 
mandates that a patient with capacity must give consent before 
being subject to any medical procedure. This is a reflection and 
reaffirmation of the principle of patient autonomy or right of self-
determination of a person(Airedale NHS Trust v Bland, 1993; see 
Schloendorff v Society of New York Hospital, 1914, p. 126: “every 
human being of adult years and sound mind has a right to 
determine what shall be done with his own body”). For consent to 
treatment to be legally valid, three elements must be present 
(Grubb, Liang, & McHale, 2010, ¶ 8.68): 
1. consent must be given by a person with capacity; 
2. consent must be based upon information about risks; and 
3. consent must be voluntary.  
It is with the second element of a valid consent that the doctrine of 
„informed consent‟ relates to. The doctrine was first formulated in 
the United States in 1971 in the case of Canterbury v Spence.1In this 
case, the doctrine was formulated to impose a duty on physicians 
to disclose all material risks. Slowly, this doctrine in its various 
manifestations came to be recognized in the United Kingdom 
(Sidaway v Board of Governors of the Bethlem Royal Hospital and the 
Maudsley Hospital and others, 1985; and later comprehensively 
adopted in Chester v Afshar, 2004) and to a certain extent in India.  
Definition of Informed Consent 
Consent is considered fully informed when a capacitated (or 
“competent”) patient or research subject to whom full disclosures 
have been made and who understands fully all that has been 
disclosed, voluntarily consents to treatment or participation on this 
                                                          
1464 F 2d 772 (1972). 
Indian Courts and Social Change                           Artha J SocSci, 11, 4, (2012) 
35 
 
basis (Eyal, 2012). This definition though is not very helpful in 
understanding the constituents of the doctrine. The interpretation 
of informed consent has turned on various factors such as rick 
disclosure, nature of risk, and extent of disclosure and so on. 
Though it is agreed that certain minimum standards of informed 
consent must exist, it is generally the case that medical ethics places 
a higher standard of compliance than medical law (Miola, 2007). 
The doctrine of informed consent therefore demands recognition of 
a patient‟s right to be informed of the risks inherent in medical 
treatment, side effects and alternatives to the proposed 
treatment(Cane & Conaghan, 2008, p. 202).  
Informed consent is important both in medical procedures as well 
as medical research. This paper will focus only on the former, 
however, where necessary, references to the latter will be made. 
This paper will examine the development of the doctrine of 
informed consent in both the UK and India. In Part I, the 
development of the case law from Sidaway to Chester and beyond 
will analysed. This part will conclude with the current legal and 
ethical position relating to informed consent in the UK. In Part II, 
the law in India relating to consent and specifically informed 
consent will be analysed. Also, an effort will be made to place the 
applicability and development of the doctrine in a statutory law 
setting. Part III Conclusion will contain an analysis into whether 
informed consent and mechanisms put in place to effectuate it 
actually enhance patient choice and autonomy and to that end if 
they validate the existence of such a doctrine.  Especially the need 
for a doctrine of informed consent in India will be discussed, with 
its myriad insufficiencies in the health and medical care sector and 
with the lessons that must be learnt from experiences with the 
doctrine in other countries. Finally, the author will comment as to 
how the courts can play a positive role in bringing about social 
change by adopting the doctrine of informed consent. 
Development of the Doctrine of Informed Consent 
Philosophical grounding of the doctrine 
The main debates surrounding informed consent deal with 
principles such as protection, autonomy, prevention of abusive 
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conduct, trust, self-ownership, non-domination, and personal 
integrity (Eyal, 2012).  
However, Peter H Schuck identifies informed consent to be of three 
variations: informed consent „in books‟, „in mind‟ and „in action‟ 
(Schuck, Rethinking Informed Consent, 1994, p. 903). The first is 
what the courts and legislatures deem informed consent to be, the 
second is what a doctor or practitioner believes to be binding in 
him as a requirement of informed consent and the third is what in 
reality is practiced as informed consent. Schuck makes it clear that 
there exist considerable gaps between the three and especially in 
the academic opinion about informed consent and its true 
applicability and scope. Schuck proposes that informed consent 
must be reconsidered to make it more cost-effective, to ensure that 
risks are communicated with a comparative cost-benefit analysis 
and finally that any perception of risks is dependent on the context 
a particular individual or society places it in (Schuck, p. 906; for a 
similar argument, see Manson & O‟Neill, 2007, pp. 68-96). 
The point of consent procedures is to limit deception and coercion, 
they should be designed to give patients and others control over 
the amount of information they receive an opportunity to rescind 
consent already given (O'Neill, 2003, pp. 4-7; for a moral point-of-
view of informed consent, see Pattinson, 2006, p. 116). 
United Kingdom: From bolam and sidaway to chester and beyond 
The development of a duty to disclose risks to patients becoming a 
part of the doctrine of informed consent began with the Bolam case 
(Bolam v Friern Hospital Management Committee, 1957).This case 
declined any application of the informed consent doctrine in the 
UK and instead reaffirmed the paternalistic attitude that courts had 
towards the medical profession.  The approach was more on the 
lines of whether the standard of risk disclosure required of doctors 
was an „accepted medical practice‟: that a doctor would not be 
negligent if he failed to disclose a risk and which failure was 
endorsed by a responsible body of medical opinion (Stauch, Wheat, 
& Tingle, 2006, p. 139). 
The first case after Bolam, where a classic informed consent/risk 
disclosure scenario was examined was the Sidaway case (Sidaway v 
Board of Governors of the Bethlem Royal Hospital and the Maudsley 
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Hospital and others, 1985). The decision in this case turned on how a 
risk could be defined to be material so as to make it necessary to be 
disclosed.2In Sidaway, therefore, the decision of disclosure of risk 
was primarily left to the clinical judgment of the doctors rather 
than respecting the autonomy of the patient.3One reason why this 
might have been the decision is because Sidaway related to the 
provision of unsought information. The Sidaway judgment came to 
be followed in two subsequent decisions of the UK Court of Appeal 
(Blyth v Bloomsbury Health Authority, 1993; Gold v Haringey Health 
Authority, 1988). 
The balance slowly started towards a more pro-patient approach 
from the erstwhile pro-doctor approach with two decisions of the 
Court of Appeal (Smith v Tunbridge Wells Health Authority, 1994; 
Pearce v United Bristol Healthcare NHS Trust, 1999). 
The watershed moment in UK law relating to informed consent 
came when the House of Lords recognized the doctrine of informed 
consent in the landmark case of Chester v Afshar.4 This case accepted 
the primacy of the ethical principle of self-determination which 
forms the bedrock of individual or patient autonomy (Miola, 2007, 
p. 73). Holding that surgery performed without informed consent 
of the patient is unlawful, their Lordships declared that in modern 
law „paternalism no longer rules‟ (Chester v Afshar, 2004, ¶¶ 16 & 
18). In reaffirming that informed consent was a basic human right 
of a patient and that it protected the dignity and autonomy of the 
patient, the court held that the duty to inform the patient of risks 
was in itself a form of damage if it was not adhered to (Chester v 
Afshar, 2004, ¶¶ 55). For the same reasons, proving causation and 
that an injury was caused due to failure of informing the patient 
about risks was irrelevant. The Chester decision cured an imbalance 
which existed in a doctor-patient relationship by providing a 
                                                          
2Courts in the UK had already held that a patient must be broadly 
informed about the risks associated with a particular medical procedure 
for the purpose of obtaining consent: Chatterton v Gerson [1981] QB 432. 
3Although Lord Scarman showed a preference to the „prudent patient‟ test 
that was also known as the doctrine of informed consent in the US. 
4[2004] UKHL 41 (Lords Steyn, Hope and Walker delivered the majority 
opinion and Lords Bingham and Hoffman dissented). 
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patient a right to receive information (Jones, 1999, p. 103). It is 
recognized that nowadays the dichotomy between the „prudent 
patient‟ test and the „reasonable/prudent doctor‟ test have 
vanished as professional organizations for medical practitioners 
themselves provide for informed consent to be taken by medical 
practitioners (Stauch, 2005, p. 66). 
The Chester decision has been recently applied in a case where a 
doctor was held liable for failing to disclose comparative risk data 
for a particular procedure(Birch v University College London 
Hospital NHS Foundation Trust, 2008). 
In Canadian law for example, under the doctrine of informed 
consent, the doctor has a duty to disclose all „material‟ or „unusual 
or special‟ risks. These risks are more or less such risks that the 
court feels would affect the mind of a patient when deciding 
whether or not to accept the treatment proposed (Lewis, 2006, p. 
370). The doctrine of informed consent also includes a duty to 
answer questions and to inform the patient about alternative forms 
of treatment (Francis QC & Johnstone, 2001, pp. 10-11). 
It has also been argued that the doctor-patient relationship being a 
fiduciary relationship imposes a duty of disclosure on the doctors. 
This could be a new approach in looking at the doctrine of 
informed consent (Jackson, 2010, p. 210; Brazier, 1987; contrast with 
Kennedy, 1986, p. 138). It is thus clear that courts have played a 
critical role in the UK in adopting and applying the doctrine of 
informed consent. However, the Indian courts have not been so 
eager to do so. 
Development of Informed Consent in India 
Judicial approach to ‘informed consent’ 
In India, the Supreme Court has given primacy to the Bolam 
principle of accepted medical practice in determining cases of 
medical negligence (Samira Kohli v Dr. Prabha Manchanda, 2008; Smt. 
Vinitha Ashok v Lakshmi Hospital and others, 2001; Achutrao Haribhau 
Khodwa and Others v State of Maharashtra and Others, 1996; Indian 
Medical Association v V.P. Shantha and Others, 1995). 
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In fact in the V.P. Shantha case, the Supreme Court had an occasion 
to remark whether the doctrine of informed consent could be 
applied in India at all and the Court said (Indian Medical Association 
v V.P. Shantha and Others, 1995, p. 666): 
38. In India, majority of citizens requiring medical 
care and treatment fall below the poverty line. Most 
of them are illiterate or semi-literate. They cannot 
comprehend medical terms, concepts, and treatment 
procedures. They cannot understand the functions 
of various organs or the effect of removal of such 
organs. They do not have access to effective but 
costly diagnostic procedures. Poor patients lying in 
the corridors of hospitals after admission for want of 
beds or patients waiting for days on the roadside for 
an admission or a mere examination, is a common 
sight. For them, any treatment with reference to 
rough and ready diagnosis based on their outward 
symptoms and doctor's experience or intuition is 
acceptable and welcome so long as it is free or 
cheap; and whatever the doctor decides as being in 
their interest, is usually unquestioningly accepted. 
They are a passive, ignorant and uninvolved in 
treatment procedures. 
39. The poor and needy face a hostile medical 
environment inadequacy in the number of hospitals 
and beds, non-availability of adequate treatment 
facilities, utter lack of qualitative treatment, 
corruption, callousness and apathy. Many poor 
patients with serious ailments (e.g. heart patients 
and cancer patients) have to wait for months for 
their turn even for diagnosis, and due to limited 
treatment facilities, many die even before their turn 
comes for treatment. What choice do these poor 
patients have? Any treatment of whatever degree, is 
a boon or a favour, for them. The stark reality is that 
for a vast majority in the country, the concepts of 
informed consent or any form of consent, and choice 
in treatment, have no meaning or relevance. 
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40. The position of doctors in government and 
charitable hospitals, who treat them, is also 
unenviable. They are overworked, understaffed, 
with little or no diagnostic or surgical facilities and 
limited choice of medicines and treatment 
procedures. They have to improvise with virtual 
non-existent facilities and limited dubious 
medicines. They are required to be committed, 
service oriented and non-commercial in outlook. 
What choice of treatment can these doctors give to 
the poor patients? What informed consent can they 
take from them? 
It is clear that due to the constant reliance on the Bolam principle (as 
late as 2009 in Martin F. D'Souza v Mohd. Ishfaq, 2009), the position 
in India continues to be that which existed in the UK when the 
Sidaway decision was pronounced. The primary reason for the 
Supreme Court‟s paternalistic and protective attitude towards 
doctors and the medical profession seems to be due to the nature of 
polity and society in India. Owing to its largely poor, illiterate and 
ill-informed citizenry, it would be extremely onerous for law to 
place an obligation on the doctor to follow the doctrine of informed 
consent. Even if such an obligation were to be imposed, it would 
become nugatory as a patient would not be able to fully 
comprehend the risks and dangers associated with a particular 
medical procedure. However, as we may see, the Code of Medical 
Ethics Regulations does give limited recognition to the doctrine of 
implied consent. 
The Supreme Court in Samira Kohli however notes that currently in 
India due to the ground realities only the Bolam and Sidaway 
principles are amenable but that the doctrine of informed consent 
(as recognized in Canterbury v Spence in the US) would be the way 
to go if(Samira Kohli v Dr. Prabha Manchanda, 2008): 
. . .  [m]edical practitioners and private hospitals 
become more and more commercialized, and if there 
is a corresponding increase in the awareness of 
patient's rights among the public, inevitably, a day 
may come when we may have to move towards 
Canterbury. But not for the present. 
Indian Courts and Social Change                           Artha J SocSci, 11, 4, (2012) 
41 
 
Statutory framework: 
1. Indian Medical Council (Professional conduct, Etiquette and 
Ethics) Regulations, 2002 made under the Indian Medical 
council act, 1956 (“code of medical ethics regulations”): 
The Code of Medical Ethics Regulations came into force on 11 
March 2002 and are made by the Central Government under the 
Indian Medical Council Act, 1956 (Code of Ethics Regulations, 
2002: power to make regulations prescribed in Section 20A read 
with Section 33(m) of the Indian Medical Council Act, 1956). 
As stated, they relate to the “Professional Conduct, Etiquette and 
Ethics for registered medical practitioners” in India. Having 
statutory force, these regulations have a wide scope as they deal 
with the duties of physicians in general, physicians‟ duties to 
patients, physicians‟ duties in consultation, physicians‟ 
responsibilities to each other, physicians‟ duties to the public and 
the paramedics, unethical acts and professional misconduct. A 
method of punishment and disciplinary action for professional 
misconduct is also provided for in the Regulations.  
Relevant to our discussion on informed consent is the last chapter 
in the Regulations which deals with „Professional Misconduct‟ 
(Code of Ethics Regulations, 2002, Regulation 7). A physician is 
liable for disciplinary action for professional misconduct for any 
commission or omission envisaged in the Regulations – there are 24 
such instances. At least three of these instances refer to a 
requirement of obtaining consent or informed consent. They are: 
7.16 Before performing an operation the physician 
should obtain in writing the consent from the husband 
or wife, parent or guardian in the case of minor, or 
the patient himself as the case may be. In an 
operation which may result in sterility the consent of 
both husband and wife is needed... 
7.21 No act of invitro fertilization or artificial 
insemination shall be undertaken without the 
informed consent of the female patient and her spouse 
as well as the donor. Such consent shall be obtained 
in writing only after the patient is provided, at her 
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own level of comprehension, with sufficient 
information about the purpose, methods, risks, 
inconveniences, disappointments of the procedure 
and possible risks and hazards. 
7.22 Research: Clinical drug trials or other research 
involving patients or volunteers as per the 
guidelines of ICMR can be undertaken, provided 
ethical considerations are borne in mind. Violation 
of existing ICMR guidelines in this regard shall 
constitute misconduct. Consent taken from the 
patient for trial of drug or therapy which is not as 
per the guidelines shall also be construed as 
misconduct . . . . (Emphasis supplied) 
 
The first situation where written consent of a patient or his kin is 
required is where an operation will be performed by the physician. 
The second, and the only statutory recognition for the doctrine of 
informed consent in India, is where informed consent must be 
obtained in an IVF (in-vitro fertilization) or artificial insemination 
procedure from a female patient, her spouse and the donor of the 
semen. Finally, consent is necessary for clinical drug trials or 
therapy according to the Indian Council for Medical Research 
Guidelines in that regard (ICMR Ethical Guidelines for Biomedical 
Research on Human Participants, 2006). 
It is evident that the constituents of informed consent in 
IVF/artificial insemination procedures are actually spelt out in the 
regulation. These cumulative constituents are: 
1. Informed Consent must be obtained in writing;  
2. It must be obtained after providing the patient sufficient 
information about the purpose, methods, risks, hazards, 
inconveniences, disappointments of the procedure; and  
3. Such information must be provided at the patient’s own level 
of comprehension.  
Failure to obtain informed consent in an IVF procedure exposes a 
medical practitioner to disciplinary action under the Regulations 
(Code of Ethics Regulations, 2002, Regulation 8). A complaint in 
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this regard can be made by any person to the Medical Council of 
India or the respective State Medical Council and there is no 
restriction on who can lodge this complaint. After receiving the 
complaint, the Council can enquire into the alleged professional 
misconduct, in this case failure to obtain informed consent, and 
give a hearing to the accused practitioner. If a physician is found to 
be guilty, then the Council has power to take any necessary steps in 
punishing him/her, as well as deleting the name of the physician 
from the list of registered practitioners authorised to practice 
medicine. In the interim, before a decision of guilt is made, a 
physician can also be circumscribed from performing any medical 
procedure or practice under scrutiny.  
Being the only recognition of the doctrine of informed consent, it is 
clear that due to its limited applicability (to IVF procedures) it is 
insufficient to ensure that the aims of informed consent are 
achieved in medical practice and care in India. Also, failure to 
obtain informed consent exposes a physician or other medical 
professional to liability in negligence. The Code of Medical Ethics 
Regulations, to that effect, provide for a feeble remedy, where only 
the practitioner is punished but the victim does not get any redress 
for the injury caused to him/her.  
It is necessary to point out that if informed consent cannot be 
generally applicable in medical negligence claims, why is it that the 
Code of Medical Ethics Regulations makes informed consent 
mandatory for IVF/artificial insemination procedures. Is this a 
pointed to the fact that such procedures are generally opted by 
people who are relatively well-off than the other sections of the 
society? Are these people necessarily more educated and informed 
to be able to make a rational choice when presented with the risks 
and dangers of a treatment?  
Alternatively, what level of informed consent can be made 
applicable in India? The answer to that question is complex for two 
reasons. One, there is a serious dichotomy in the nature of medical 
facilities that are available in urban and rural settings in India. 
While, patient autonomy is integral to every human being 
irrespective of their economic or social standing, the doctor can be 
given some discretion to decide how much information about risks 
can be disclosed in different settings. Here, the communicative role 
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of a doctor becomes important. He must understand the perception 
and the context in which a patient looks at the risk and then 
disclose the same. However, this reinforces the „reasonable doctor‟ 
test which has been discarded in the UK since Chester. Secondly, if 
the doctor is given the discretion to decide the „best interest‟ of the 
patients in a country like India that may also lead to misuse which 
the principles behind informed consent militate against.  
Transplantation of Human Organs Act, 1994 
When a person decides to donate his/her organ under the 
Transplantation of Human Organs Act, 1994, the Authority under 
the Act is under an obligation to inform the donor of the possible 
outcomes and postoperative changes after the transplant surgery. 
Lack of informed consent in such cases will vitiate the entire 
process(Pawan Anand and another v Director General of Health 
Services and others, 2012). 
Consumer Protection Act, 1986 
The Consumer Protection Act („CPA‟) has also been invoked in 
many cases of medical negligence since the Supreme Court in V.P. 
Shantha permitted the same (Indian Medical Association v V.P. 
Shantha and Others, 1995). In various cases under the CPA, the 
consumer forums and commissions have held doctors to be 
negligent for failure to obtain informed consent (Dr. AK Mittal & 
Anr v. Rajkumar & Another, 2009; H.S. Tuli v Post Graduate Institute of 
Medical and others, 2008; Saroj Chandoke and others v Sri Ganga 
Hospital and others, 2007). 
Conclusion 
It is clear that unlike many other fields of law where Indian law 
mirrors the changes in the UK, in the case of doctrine of informed 
consent, the current economic and societal problems do not permit 
us to apply a liberated doctrine of informed consent in India.  
However, the forward-thinking ruling of the House of Lords in 
Chester cannot be sidelined. The question eventually boils down to 
whether medical ethics should follow the law or vice-versa. In 
Sidawayand Chester both the courts held that law should be in the 
driver‟s seat. In India, there is no reason why this should not be the 
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case. Additionally, informed consent has already been recognized 
in the Code of Medical Ethics which points to the fact that there is a 
readiness in the people of India and more importantly the medical 
profession to assume a greater responsibility in disclosure of 
material risks before performing medical procedures. The way 
forward would be to recognize this and to implement it in other 
areas of medical practice and only then will the principles of bodily 
autonomy and self-determination be of value to Indians. This role 
is primarily of the courts in India and by only recognizing this can 
the courts bring about any substantial social changes, especially in 
promoting patient rights 
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